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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction of this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(j) because it is 
an appeal taken from a final judgment in a civil matter. 
This matter was heard by a jury in the Third Judicial 
District Court, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon presiding. After 
a six-day trial, the jury found in favor of the defendant, Kirton, 
McConkie & Bushnell, and returned a special verdict accordingly. 
Defendant's post-trial motion for indemnification for attorneys' 
fees was denied. Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell requests that the 
jury verdict be affirmed and that the denial of its motion for 
indemnification be reversed. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(1) Whether the trial judge erred in refusing to admit 
into evidence the affidavit of Robert Bailie and certain testimony 
of Ivan Radman. 
(2) Whether the jury's finding of contributory 
negligence is supported by competent evidence. 
(3) Whether the damage award should be reversed as based 
on speculation or conjecture. 
ISSUE ON CROSS APPEAL 
Whether Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, as an agent of 
Western Fiberglass, Inc., is entitled to indemnification for its 
costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees incurred in defending Western 
Fiberglass' legal malpractice suit against it. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 
Rule 103(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or precludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the 
context within which questions were asked. 
Rule 801(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial 
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted. 
Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law 
or by these rules. 
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time 
as the Court reasonably directs, any party may file 
written requests that the Court instruct the jury on a 
law as set forth in said requests. The Court shall 
inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests 
prior to instructing the jury; and it shall furnish 
counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless 
the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given 
orally or otherwise waive this requirement. If the 
instructions are to be given in writing, all objections 
thereto must be made before the instructions are given to 
the jury; otherwise, objections may be made to the 
instructions after they are given to the jury, but before 
the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may 
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an 
instruction unless he objects thereto. In objecting to 
the giving of an instruction, a party must state 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds 
for his objection. Notwithstanding the foregoing 
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requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and 
in the interests of justice, may review the giving of or 
failure to give an instruction. Opportunity shall be 
given to make objections, and they shall be made out of 
the hearing of the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made 
after the court has instructed the jury. The Court shall 
not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the Court 
states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors 
that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of 
fact. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 16-10-4(2)(a)-(c): 
A copy of this section is attached to this brief as 
Addendum 3. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an action brought by 
Western Fiberglass, Inc. against Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell for 
negligence in representing Western in a sale of equipment to 
United Fiberglass, Inc. Western claimed that Kirton, McConkie & 
Bushnell (1) failed to perfect a security interest in United's 
accounts receivable, and (2) failed to inform Western Fiberglass 
that Western's right to repossess the equipment upon United*s 
default was subject to the liens of a bank. 
B. Course of Proceedings. This case was tried to a jury 
from December 1, 1987, through December 9, 1987. The matter was 
submitted to the jury by special verdict. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court. At the close of 
Western's case, Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell moved the court for a 
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directed verdict, The court took the motion under advisement. 
The case was submitted to the jury by a special verdict. As to 
the equipment claim, the jury found that Kirton had a duty to 
advise Western Fiberglass, Inc. that Western's right to take the 
equipment from United Fiberglass, Inc. upon default was subject to 
the lien of the bank. The jury also found that Western was so 
advised. As to the accounts receivable claim, the jury found that 
Western subordinated its interest in United*s accounts receivable 
to Sovran Bank and that Western and Kirton were both 50 percent 
negligent. 
Following the trial, Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell moved 
the court for an order requiring Western Fiberglass to indemnify 
Kirton for the attorneys" fees and expenses incurred by it in 
defending this action. The court denied Kirton's motion. 
D. Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review. In 
1978, Ivan Radman formed Western Fiberglass, Inc. ("Western"), a 
Utah corporation, and became its president. Prior to coming to 
Salt Lake City in 1978, Mr. Radman had been a successful 
businessman in Australia, where he had owned and managed a 
-^Following the trial, Judge Russon denied the motion for a 
directed verdict as moot in light of the jury's verdict. Judge 
Russon indicated that had the jury returned a verdict for 
plaintiff, he would have given "very, very serious consideration" 
to granting the motion. Judge Russon also wanted this Court to 
know his feelings on this point. Vol. 492 at 17-18. 
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construction company and two insulation manufacturing companies. 
As the manager companies Radman personal] y 
negotiated all z contracts 50'? at 31 35 
Western was formed £oi r.e ourpose of manufacturing 
insulation Following construction * i ts p3 ant ii :i 19(30, Western 
began to produce fiberglass insulation it also sought potential 
f oi t he f; qui I pnienl' i I; had deve 1 i/i'pt-5 i:1 t: :> produce f iberq 1 ass; 
insulation In early 1982, Mi - Radman negotiated a contract for 
the sale of equipment to an Italian company The Italian buyer 
i;i.?cjuj t ed W^stei :i : tc :: b tai n and cie 11 i ^  ' er c 3 et: cer of credi t: to 
guarantee Western's performance. Mr Radman negotiated and 
drafted this contract. M- * translated :* from English to 
•ransaction. Vol. 
41-45. Later, the Italian company defaulted and made a 
claim on Western's letter of credit. Vol. 50 7 at 45-47. 
In June Western was approached ?w a Virginia 
company called United Fiberglass, Inc. ("United") regarding a 
pi ireh ase of fiberglass • ' * »0 7 at; hi 
United had previously beei . manufacture! : ockwool insulation. 
However, after only a week of producing rockwool insulation, 
flnited's equi i pmeinl burned up Ilfn 11 t;idl r ill H I i n ^ i i i m e n f u r I h e 
loss, and was forced to file a Chapter . bankruptcy. At the time 
United contacted Western, United attempting to come out of 
ID a n k t: u p t c y a s
 (-i f i b e i«'.) 1 a s s j n s i j J - i n J (' a t 1 111 • e r V n I " 11 
151-52. 
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During the summer of 1982, Robert Bailie, of United, and 
Mr. Radman, of Western, negotiated a contract pursuant to which 
Western would sell fiberglass insulation manufacturing equipment 
tjo United. After Mr. Bailie and Mr. Radman negotiated the terms 
of the contract, United's attorneys drafted a written Equipment 
Purchase Agreement in September, 1982, in which Western would sell 
the equipment to a Virginia limited partnership, who would then 
lease the equipment to United. Vol. 507 at 51-53. The agreement 
provided, in pertinent part, for deferred payments of a portion of 
the purchase price, a security interest to Western in an escrow 
account, a letter of credit obligation on the part of Western, and 
a default provision entitling Western to remove its equipment upon 
United's default. Exh. 1-P, 1f1f 2.02, 3.01, 3.02, 6.03. Also, as 
part of the transaction, Mr. Radman was to become a member of 
United's board of directors and a shareholder and participate in 
the management of United. Vol. 508 at 20. 
After the Equipment Purchase Agreement was negotiated and 
drafted, Mr. Radman brought the agreement to Dwight Williams at 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell ("Kirton") and asked Mr. Williams to 
give it a "quick review." After reviewing the agreement, Mr. 
Williams told Mr. Radman that there were certain provisions of the 
contract that were not in Western's best interest, such as the 
letter of credit obligation by Western with no corresponding 
obligation on the part of United. Mr. Williams also said he would 
have done things differently if he had been involved in the 
-6-
negotiations- Mr. Radman thei 1 askei 1 Mi •. Wi lliams to talk to 
Diiiied s attorneys and get them to change the agreement. Vol. s ; = R 
flit 4#v 4 7 1-12. 
Whei Wiil i an. • dcteci United's attorneys about 
changing the agreement, United*s attorneys told him that the 
agreement was - .:o: *- >ax dim t *- tn rene-
qotiate it thincr was • enegotiated, including the price 
to be paid -. Western, ?: Williams reported this conversation to 
Mr. Radman. Mr. Radman Williams Western was not 
villinq tn i eoperi negotiations and that Western would have to live 
with the contract as is vol. 3 08 at 112 13, 
After thi* and until rhn final agreement was 
signed in May - Radman consulted with Mr. Williams and 
other attorneys at Kirton regarding specifi< ^visions io T p 
agreement. \h - the agreement to reflect 
I fnited's request change .: financing from a lease 
arrangement iirect purchase United * h h bank financing. 
When the f i nanged, Williams told Mr. Radman that 
Western's r ; ake back !t equipment upon default 
would be subject \m* ±±t Vol, 50 8 at 101 Both 
(Hi fMilie -3's attorney, Dan McCormack, also told this to 
Mi " Radman 509 at 50-51, 162 Because the eq\ li pment sold 
by Western was iu ut liens, United gave Western 
a beciiiity interest in a portion of United"s accounts receivable. 
Vol, 508 at 114-15; Exh. 11 • P, 1 2.03. 
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During the same period of time (September, 1982 through 
May, 1983), Mr. Radman negotiated directly with the attorneys for 
United. He wrote to United1s attorneys and they wrote to him. 
Vol. 507 at 68-72; Exhs. 2-P, 3-P, 8-D, 102-D. Mr. Radman spoke 
to United's attorneys by phone on numerous occasions without 
Western's attorneys present. Vol. 507 at 64-67; Exh. 52-D; Vol. 
509 at 128-29, 140-41, 155-56, 163-66. He met twice with United's 
attorneys in Virginia without Mr. Williams present, including an 
all-day meeting one month before the final agreement was signed. 
Vol. 509 at 87-88, 153-54, 165; Exh. 123-D at 87-88. In addition 
to receiving correspondence directly from United1s attorneys, Mr. 
Radman also received other letters and documents regarding the 
transaction, which he neither read nor remembered giving to Mr. 
Williams. Vol. 507 at 73-75. 
Shortly before the agreement was signed, Mr. Williams 
advised Mr. Radman to have someone at the closing in Virginia who 
could make certain that everything was taken care of. Vol. 508 at 
88, 118-19. Mr. Radman said that it would be too expensive to 
send someone. Mr. Williams offered to combine the closing with 
another trip he had scheduled to Washington D.C. so that Western 
would not have to pay for Mr. Williams' travel time and expenses, 
but Mr. Radman said "no" and that he would have United's attorneys 
take care of any necessary filings. Vol. 508 at 79-80, 87-89. 
The closing took place in Virginia without either Mr. 
Radman or anyone from Kirton present. Although Mr. Radman told 
-8-
Mr W:i ] liams that he woul:: have United's attorneys take care of 
the necessary filings, United*s attorneys did not file any 
f i n a n e i n g s t a t HUP I 11 , 11 in M • i yc i n J I \ t s 11 i t< ] v a 111 e . ^ u 1 IOUL nq t h e 
closing, Western manufactured the equipment and installed it in 
United's plant in January of 1984 Ar i hat time Western rpceived 
cere a in payments as < ai'ieci n the agreement. 
Two months after installation of the equipment and after 
a bad experience with the letter ui UL if ii„ i hv Italian 
Western asked United release 
Western from :. *~ obligation ! continue the letter credit. 
Vol. 507 • 85-87; Exh. 41 -u. ' *- - d P I I i H d ir he i * » . 
* n~\-> ,r- v months later, United needed 
to borrow additional funds from Sovran Bank, its primary lending 
i n s t i t u t I o ri S ov i a ri I':i a i m Ik w i»111 ti n < 11. a (1 v a, 11 c k« 11111„ h e i t u n d s u n 1 e s s 
Western agreed to subordinate its security interest in United's 
accounts receivable to that of the bank Western agreed 
subord i itati-11 u the bcink -mcl -j"!so agree: t-o release its interest in 
United s accounts receivable in exchange for United releasing 
Western from the letter of credit obligation Vol MI ai cO- IL*H 
1 • 11)i> ,„, Kxhs. 20-P, lb l\ 33-D, 19-D After 
Western had subordinated and released its security interest in the 
accounts receivable, Mr. Radman told K;,fc'1 - "'"' • *• thi^ se a tions. 
Vol- 509 ai ] 05 1 07; Exh 1 7-D. Then, :>f 1985, United 
went out of business because of problems with the equipment. Vol. 
509 at 51. 
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The money United collected from its accounts receivable 
was not enough to pay the loans to Sovran Bank. Vol. 509 at 
10-13. The loans to Sovran Bank were eventually paid by personal 
guarantors. Vol. 510 at 14-15. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Western's case centers on two acts of alleged malpractice: 
(1) the alleged failure of Kirton to inform Western that Western's 
priority in certain equipment was subordinate to a bank, and (2) 
Kirton's alleged failure to perfect a security interest in 
accounts receivable of United Fiberglass. The jury found that 
Western had been told that the bank would have a superior interest 
in the equipment. The jury also found that Kirton had a duty to 
perfect the security interest in the accounts receivable, but that 
Western was 50 percent negligent because of the actions Western 
took. 
Western appeals the jury's findings on both the equipment 
and the accounts receivable claims. With respect to the equipment 
claim, Western alleges prejudicial error because the judge refused 
to admit into evidence an affidavit of Robert Bailie, and the 
judge refused to admit into evidence certain testimony of Ivan 
Radman concerning actions Western claims it would have taken had 
it "known" that its right to repossess the equipment would be 
subordinate to the rights of the bank. 
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• Westeri i's claims about the Bailie affidavit are unfounded 
fox three reasons. First, Mr. Bailie was on the stand at the 
request of Westerr . surfi i« Jesieni had ihe opportunity to 
quest it .» about the substance of the affidavit Second, 
Western c :.o- preserve the issue for appeal by making a 
proffer. adence clearly requires 
the party to preserve any evidentiary issues by revealing the 
substance of the evidence '• - uuutu Third, Western offered no 
reason whv I he affidri'it H P admitted into evidence. 
Affidavits are classic examples of hearsay evidence, and Western 
has claimed no exception to the hearsay i"u,le I hat wnulri justify 
admisuion t>t Lhis document into evidence. 
Western1 s allegations of error, as they relate t >' N f » 
exclusion oi the Radman tpstinmny, ha '«•» pven less basis. Not only 
did Western fail I,n mnkn a proffer, which is grounds in and of 
itself for -ejecting Western's argument, but the issue \ ^ m ri 
The I I I ..it WVsteii'i waii I. old that its right repossess 
the equipment would be subordinate to that of; the bank, Th^re is 
evidence rr support this finding. In li'fjht n ,,«"«, finding, 
the *. .tional testimony regarding what Western 
"would have done had it known that its claim would be subordinate 
to that of the bank" at best constitute hairnlpss en, 01; 
u aspect to the accounts receivable claim, Western 
claims *"*.. errors { O that the jury's finding that the plaintiff 
was 50 percent negliqetii evidence, and 
- 11 -
(2) that the jury's determination of the amount of damages is not 
supported by the evidence. Kirton agrees that the jury's 
determination of the amount of damages is unsupportable, but, 
unlike Western, Kirton claims there is no competent evidence of 
damages. The only evidence that Western introduced to prove 
damages was the balance sheet showing the book amount of accounts 
receivable. Western introduced no evidence showing that the 
accounts receivable had a fair market value equal to the value 
shown on the balance sheet. As for the question of whether 
competent evidence exists to support the finding of 50 percent 
comparative negligence, the transcript is replete with testimony 
upon which the jury could base its finding, including Western's 
refusal to permit Kirton to attend the closing, Western's attempt 
to reduce attorney's fees by insisting that United's counsel file 
the financing statements (as opposed to Kirton), and Western's 
release/subordination of its security interest in the accounts 
receivable. 
Kirton has filed a cross appeal in this case. Section 
16-10-4(2)(c) of the Utah Business Corporation Act requires a 
corporation to indemnify its agent whenever the corporation sues 
the agent and the agent prevails. The jury found that an agency 
relationship existed between Kirton and Western. Kirton also 
prevailed in the suit. As such, Kirton should be awarded its 
costs and fees incurred in defending this action. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE BAILIE AFFIDAVIT WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM KV1DF.NCE. 
Western claims that the trial judge committed prejudicial 
error by refusing admission ihe affidavit of Robert Bailie into 
evidence, wt - - * •• is, howpvpi , because ( 1, "i Robert 
Bailie was called by Western as a witness and Western had ample 
opportunity * ask questions about the substance of the affidavit; 
< "-- . t — • , - -^ ;n appeal by making a 
proffer of evidence; and (3) Western offered no grounds to the 
trial judge for admitting this hearsay testimony i nto evi dence. 
A. Prejudicial Error Did Not occur Because Western Had the 
Opportunity to Examine the Affiant About the Substance 
of His Affidavit. 
Rule 103(a) * the Utah Rules of Evidence states that an 
error may nnt 1: e pT« HI npm H m l ir H 111 ;-i i exc 11 Miles e 'idence 
unless a substantial right of the parry is affected At the time 
Western attempted tr ntroduce the affidavit of Robert Bailie :i nto 
evidence, . un t, lie witness stand, having been 
called by Western,, u \s cr.y*- Although the Court refused to 
permit the affidavit into evidence, nothing prevented Western *'mm 
q - . J i \P d subject matter of the affidavit 
Vol. 509 at 63-65. 
The law , clear that prejudicial err i::)i: does not c> :n :UJ : 
when i lie offei iny party has an opportunity to have the same 
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evidence admitted through other means. Dahnken, Inc., of Salt 
Lake City v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986). See also, First 
Realty & Inv. Company, Inc., vs. Rubert, 100 Idaho 493, 600 P.2d 
1149 (1979). There was no objection to Western questioning 
Mr. Bailie about the subject of his affidavit. Western cannot now 
complain because it did not take advantage of an opportunity 
available to it. 
B. Western's Failure to Make an Offer of Proof Precludes 
an Appeal. 
Rule 103(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires a 
party to make an offer of proof to the Court, or make the 
character of the evidence apparent from the context of the 
questions asked, in order to preserve for appeal the question of 
whether exclusion of the evidence was proper. This Court has 
enforced this rule literally. See, e.g., State v. Rammel, 721 
P.2d 498 (Utah 1986); Hill v. Hartoq, 658 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1983); 
Bradford v. Alvev & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980). 
Western failed to preserve for appeal its contention that 
the trial court improperly excluded the affidavit of Mr. Bailie. 
Attached as Addendum 1 is a copy of that portion of the transcript 
from the attempted introduction of the affidavit to the point 
where Western rested its case (three pages). Western made no 
offer of proof regarding the purpose of introducing the affidavit 
into evidence. Vol. 509 at 63-65 (Addendum 1). Further, Western 
failed to ask additional questions that would have indicated the 
purpose of introducing the affidavit as evidence. Id. 
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C. Western Offered the Trial court No Exception to the 
Hearsay Rule, And As Such the Exclusion Was Proper. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence *^  r» • 
• .*•• e . > .*.-.-.:• -.: :>• . : the listed 
exceptions v-.ar. E :\ i * Bailie affidavit clearly 
constitutes hearsay : . o * tement made by him 
*.. .t testifying o* ? • « . d . ale 801(c). Western 
hat« offered no basis for admission of this hearsay, either to the 
trial judge c V. I "\ ""U| at; b I-b5 (Addendum, i). 
Western has the burden of showing that the hearsay :s admissible, 
and it cannot now complain that it failed t -
trial hearsay. 
] 
THE EXCLUSION OF THE RADMAN TESTIMONY WAS AT BEST HARMLESS 
ERROR, AND IN ANY EVENT WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL. 
Western claims that it was prohibited from introducing 
the testimony of Mr. Radman, as president of Western, with respect 
to how Western wou es contract had Western 
known that i* c- epossess -N equipment free of other 
liens. Western claims that the testimony was essential in prnv,inq 
one Q£ ^j i e Pipmpri| ri Ili;ij j | »,, ^ d s e ,  inline I y „ the element of causation. 
A. The Issue of Whether the Testimony Should Have Been 
Excluded Is Moot Because the Jury Found That Kirton Did 
Not Breach Its Duty. 
By way of background, the plaiivl iff in a Ii'»|,i,l 
< ; VP oar." . id pvei y OIH-' of the following 
elements in ordei to establish the cause of action: 
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(1) That an attorney-client relationship existed; 
(2) That the attorney had a duty to the client; 
(3) That the attorney failed to perform the duty; 
(4) That the client suffered damages; and 
(5) That the attorney's negligence proximately 
caused the damage to the client. 
Stangland v. Brock, 109 Wash. 2d 675, 747 P.2d 464 (1987); 
Phillips v. Clancy, 152 Ariz. 415, 733 P.2d 300 (Ct. App. 1986); 
Chocktoot v. Smith, 280 Or. 567, 571 P.2d 1255 (1977); R. Mallen 
and V. Levit, Legal Malpractice § 657 (2d Ed. 1981) (hereinafter 
referred to as "Legal Malpractice"). 
Western claims that it needed the testimony of Mr. Radman 
in order to establish what its position would have been had Kirton 
performed properly. While it is the true that the element of 
causation requires the plaintiff to show that it would have 
benefited had the attorney performed properly, that inquiry is 
moot in this appeal because the jury found that Kirton did perform 
properly. Vol. 510 at 81-82. In other words, Western appeals on 
the ground that it was precluded from introducing evidence that 
damages were proximately caused by the alleged breach of 
2Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894 
(Utah 1978)(appropriate to inquire as to what the plaintiff's 
position would have been if the attorney had performed the act 
properly; Young v. Bridwell, 20 Utah 2d 332, 437 P.2d 686, 689 
(1968)(in order to establish a cause of action against an attorney 
for failing to advise the plaintiff of the right to appeal, 
plaintiff would have to show that there was a reasonable likelihood 
of reversing the judgment and that it would have benefited the 
plaintiff)• 
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duty. But in fact no breach of duty ever occurred. Western 
failed to prove a critical element of its case (i.e., a breach of 
duty), and any error of the trial judge relating to the exclusion 
of Mr. Radman's testimony — which would have gone to the proof of 
a different element of the cause of action — constitutes harmless 
error. 
The record is replete with evidence to support the jury's 
finding that Kirton did not breach its duty of care as it applies 
to the equipment claim. See, e.g., Vol. 508 at 162 (Dan 
McCormack); Vol. 509 at 162 (Robert Bailie); Vol. 508 at 101 
(Mr. Williams). Furthermore, Western has not challenged the 
jury's finding on this point in its appeal. 
B. Western Has Not Preserved the Issue for Appeal 
Because It Failed to Make an Offer of Proof. 
As noted earlier in this brief, Rule 103 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence requires a party to make a proffer of evidence 
in order to preserve for appeal a question regarding the propriety 
of a judge's decision to exclude evidence. See pages 13 to 14, 
supra, for a discussion of Rule 103. Kirton objected to the 
Radman testimony on the grounds that the question called for 
speculation on the part of the witness. The court sustained the 
objection. In order to preserve the issue for appeal, Rule 103 
required Western to make an offer of the evidence so that the 
court could review the evidence and determine whether the basis 
for the objection was well founded. Western's failure to do so 
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means that it is now precluded from appealing the ruling because 
there is no evidence in the record to support its claim that a 
substantial right of the party was affected. Addendum 2 is that 
portion of the transcript wherein Western attempted to introduce 
the testimony of Mr. Radman on this issue. Vol. 510 at 27-28. 
III. 
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE JURY'S FINDING 
THAT WESTERN WAS 50 PERCENT NEGLIGENT ON ITS 
ACCOUNTS-RECEIVABLE CLAIM. 
The jury found that Kirton had a duty to file a financing 
statement in order to perfect a security interest in United's 
accounts receivable, and that Kirton breached that duty. The jury 
also found that Western was 50 percent negligent in any loss 
resulting from the failure to perfect. Western has appealed the 
jury's finding of contributory negligence on the grounds that the 
evidence does not support the finding. 
There can be no doubt that contributory negligence is a 
defense in a legal malpractice claim. Helmbrecht v. St. Paul 
Insurance Co., 122 Wis. 2d 94, 362 N.W.2d 118 (1985); Hansen vs. 
Wiqhtman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (Ct. App. 1978); Ishmael 
v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Ct. App. 
1966); Legal Malpractice, S 351. Indeed, Western does not dispute 
this principle of law, as is evidenced by its failure to object to 
the jury instructions on contributory negligence. What Western 
apparently argues is that the nature of Kirton's breach was such 
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that Western could not be contributorily negligent as a matter of 
law. However, none of the cases cited by Western stand for that 
proposition. For example, in Theobold v. Byers, 193 Cal. App.2d 
147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 866 (Ct. App. 1961), the court held that 
"the trial court was correct in holding that contributory 
negligence could properly be considered a defense. . . . " The 
court ruled for the plaintiff in this case only because the facts 
did not support a finding of contributory negligence. 
Similarly, Practical Offset, Inc. v. Davis, 83 111. 
App. 3d 566, 404 N.E.2d 516 (1980), another case cited by Western, 
addresses only the issue of whether sufficient evidence existed to 
support the trial court's granting of summary judgment. The issue 
of contributory negligence was not addressed by the court. The 
only apparent relevance of Practical Offset to the case at hand is 
that both involved the failure to file a financing statement and 
in both cases the trier of fact found that the attorneys had acted 
negligently. The difference, however, is that in the case at hand 
the defendant was able to prove contributory negligence, and in 
Practical Offset there is no indication that contributory 
negligence was even raised as a defense. 
In summary, Western has offered no authority or reason 
for the proposition that the doctrine of contributory negligence 
should not apply in the current case. Furthermore, if Western 
seriously asserts this theory, it should have objected to the jury 
instructions on contributory negligence. Rule 51 of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits a party from assigning as error 
the giving of a jury instruction unless the party objects and 
states the grounds for objection. While an appeals court is not 
precluded from examining the question, this Court has held that it 
will not entertain a review absent unusual circumstances and a 
compelling reason. E. A. Strout W. Realty Agency, Inc. v. W. C. 
Foy & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983); State vs. Bell, 563 P.2d 
186 (Utah 1977); Williams v. Lloyd, 16 Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d 166 
(1965). Western has given no such reason. 
With respect to Western's claim that the record does not 
support the jury's finding, the standard rule of appellate review 
of a jury's verdict is that the verdict will not be disturbed if 
there is any reasonable support in the evidence. Uintah Pipeline 
Corp. v. White Superior, 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976); Barlow 
Upholstery & Furniture v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900 (Utah 1975). In 
this case, the record contains more than reasonable support for 
the jury's finding of contributory negligence. For example, 
Western complains that it was damaged because it did not have a 
perfected security interest in the accounts receivable. The 
evidence is clear, however, that Western had specifically 
subordinated to Sovran Bank, the only other entity with a security 
interest in the accounts receivable. When Sovran finally 
foreclosed, there was not enough money to discharge the debt owed 
to it. Vol. 509 at 10-13. The fact Western had not perfected its 
security interest did not mean that Western could not foreclose on 
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the collateral. Vol. 508 at 41-42, 131-132, 172. Perfection only 
establishes the relative priorities among the parties claiming an 
interest in the collateral. Vol. 508 at 76-77, 91. For some 
rfeason, however, Western did not foreclose. Western's 
subordination of its security interest and its failure to exercise 
its remedy against the collateral can be found by a jury as 
negligence and as contributing to the damages Western suffered. 
See, e.g., Fisk v. Newsum, 9 Wash. App. 650, 513 P.2d 1035 (Ct. 
App. 1973). 
Western also contributed to its own damages by unreason-
ably restricting its attorneys and by ignoring their advice. The 
record shows that Kirton was not asked to handle the transaction, 
but instead only to render advice on specific questions. Vol. 507 
at 53-53, 58, 61-62; Vol. 508 at 63-64; Vol. 509 at 30-31, 34-35, 
128-130, 153-157, 164-165. Western did not have Kirton involved 
in negotiating the transaction. Id* Indeed, Western had numerous 
telephone calls, meetings, and correspondence directly with 
United*s counsel. Vol. 507 at 61-79; Exhs. 2-P, 3-P, 8-D, 52-D, 
102-D, and 123-D. Western refused to follow its attorneys' advice 
to have a lawyer attend the closing to make certain that the 
details were properly handled. Vol. 508 at 88-89, 118-119. 
Western preferred instead to let United1s counsel handle the 
details, including the filing of a financing statement. Vol. 508 
at 88. All of these restrictions and limitations occurred because 
Western was extremely sensitive to legal fees. Vol. 508 at 
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130-131; Exhs. 111-P, 123-D. Such sensitivity has a risk, 
however, and the jury could reasonably find that Western's actions 
in limiting its attorneys and its own involvement in the 
transaction was negligent and contributed to the loss suffered by 
Western. 
The courts have held that such actions on the part of a 
client can. constitute contributory negligence. For example, the 
Washington Court of Appeals stated in Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. 
App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (Ct. App. 1975) that a client can be 
contributorily negligent by failing to provide information to the 
attorney or by undertaking a matter and not handling it 
correctly. See also, Fisk v. Newsum, 9 Wash. App. 650, 513 P.2d 
1035 (Ct. App. 1973). And in California, the Court of Appeals 
ruled in Theobold v. Byers, 193 Cal. App.2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 
864, 866 (Ct. App. 1961), that a client can be contributorily 
negligent if the client fails to follow the attorney's advice. In 
the words of the court: 
A patient will thus be barred from recovery for 
medical malpractice where the patient has 
disobeyed medical instructions given by a doctor 
or dentist or has administered home remedies to 
an injury without the aid of medical advice. 
There would seem to be no reason whatever why the 
same rule should not be applicable in a legal 
malpractice action where there is evidence that a 
client chose to disregard the legal advice of his 
attorney. In our opinion, any other rule would 
be grossly unfair. 
The evidence must be construed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict. Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, 
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Inc., 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 1976). The record shows that the jury 
had ample basis for finding Western contributorily negligent, and 
this Court should affirm its verdict. 
IV. 
THE JURY VERDICT ON THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SHOULD BE OVERTURNED 
BECAUSE WESTERN FAILED TO PROVE THE AMOUNT OF ITS DAMAGES. 
Western has appealed the jury's finding as to the amount 
of damages. In light of the jury's verdict finding Western 50% 
negligent, this Court does not need to address the issue of 
damages. If this Court does address damages, then Kirton agrees 
with Western that no evidence exists in the record to support the 
jury's damage award of $84,000.00. However, unlike Western, 
Kirton claims that the record shows no competent evidence of 
damages. 
As noted earlier in this brief, a plaintiff must prove 
all of the elements of a legal malpractice cause of action in 
order to prevail. One of those elements is the existence of 
damages. The amount of damages must be proven with reasonable 
certainty, or the plaintiff cannot prevail. Dunn v. McKay, 
Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 1978). This 
Court has the power to overturn a jury finding if it believes the 
award is based on conjecture or speculation. Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 
Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826 (1958). 
3See pages 15-16, supra. 
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The sole evidence Western introduced to prove damages was 
a balance sheet showing the dollar amount owed by debtors of 
United and the approximate amount of the loan to Sovran Bank (the 
entity to whom Western subordinated its interest in the accounts 
receivable). Western's argument is that the difference between 
the two is the amount of damages it suffered. Western's evidence 
of damages does not adequately prove its case. Western has not, 
for example, introduced any evidence to establish the accuracy or 
credibility of the balance sheet, such as evidence that an audit 
was performed. Vol. 509 at 21-29, 53-59. Western has not 
established that it could have completed a foreclosure action 
within the time period of the evidence introduced. Western 
introduced no evidence that the fair market value of the accounts 
receivable was equal to its book value. And Western introduced no 
evidence that the accounts receivable were collectible. In other 
words, Western has not shown the value of the security interest 
lost; it has only introduced evidence as to the face amount of the 
accounts receivable. The face amount of the accounts receivable 
is an improper measure of damages. 
In the case of Tilly v. Doe, 49 Wash. App. 727, 746 P.2d 
323 (Ct. App. 1987), the court discussed the measure of damages in 
a legal malpractice case where the attorney was liable for failing 
to perfect a security interest. The plaintiff in the case argued 
that the proper measure of damages was the fair market value of 
the collateral. The court disagreed. It said that the plaintiff 
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was required to prove "the value of the loss of the security 
interest, not the value of the personal property." Id. at 325. 
The court defined a number of factors that the plaintiff must show 
in proving the determination of the value of a lost security 
interest, including evidence of collectability. The court 
specifically noted that the burden of proving collectability rests 
with the plaintiff. IdL at 326, See also, Taylor Oil Company v. 
Weisensee, 334 N.W.2d 27, 29 (S.D. 1983). 
Like the plaintiff in Tilly, Western failed to put on any 
evidence of collectability. Western has only introduced evidence 
as to the book value of the accounts receivable, and this is 
insufficient as a matter of law to prove damages. 
V 
UNDER SECTION 16-10-4(2)(c) OF THE UTAH CODE, KIRTON, AS 
THE AGENT OF WESTERN, IS ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR 
ITS COSTS, EXPENSES AND ATTORNEYS1 FEES INCURRED IN 
DEFENDING THIS ACTION. 
A. Agents Are Entitled to Indemnification as a Matter of Law 
When They Prevail. 
Section 16-10-4(2) of the Utah Business Corporation Act, 
which is based upon section 5 of the 1967 Model Business 
Corporation Act, sets out a statutory scheme whereby a person may 
obtain indemnification for the costs of defending an action 
brought against the person and arising out of the performance of 
his/her duties as a director, officer, employee or agent. 
Subsection (a) of Section 16-10-4(2) authorizes a Utah corporation 
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to indemnify any such person for the costs in defending against an 
action brought by a third party. Utah Code Ann. S 16-10-4(2)(a) 
(1987). Subsection (b) authorizes indemnification for costs 
incurred if the claim was made by or in the right of the 
corporation (as opposed to a third-party claim). Jd. 
S 16-10-4(2)(b). These subsections are voluntary; corporations 
are authorized, but not required, to provide the indemnification 
discussed therein, and they do not necessarily require the person 
to be successful on the merits. 
Subsection (c) of Section 16-10-4(2), on the other hand, 
places upon corporations an affirmative obligation to provide 
indemnification. It states that to the extent a person "has been 
successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of any action, 
suit or proceeding" of either of the types referred to above 
(i.e., a third party suit or a suit by or in the right of the 
corporation), "he shall be indemnified against expenses (including 
attorney's fees) actually and reasonably incurred by him in 
connection therewith." Id. S 16-10-4(2)(c). 
Although the Utah courts have not addressed the 
interpretation of subsection (c), courts and commentators in other 
jurisdictions with the same or similar provisions have uniformly 
agreed that the language used in subsection (c) requires a 
corporation to provide indemnification to directors, officers, 
agents and employees who prevail. See e.g., McClean v. 
International Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214, 1221 (5th Cir. 1987); 
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Galdi v. Berg, 359 F. Supp. 698, 699-700 (D. Del. 1973); Katayama 
v. Interpacific Properties, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 3d 1604, 236 Cal. 
Rptr. 108 (Ct. App. 1987) (ordered not published, Rule 976, Cal. 
Rules of Ct.); Green v. Westcap Corp. of Delaware, 492 A.2d 260 
(Del. Super. 1985); Model Business Corp. Act Anno. § 5 (Supp. 
1977) (official comment); Heyler, Indemnification of Corporate 
Agents, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 1255 (1976). Given the plain language of 
subsection (c) and the uniformity of decisions of courts and 
interpretations of commentators, indemnification of a director, 
officer, agent or employee is mandatory when such person prevails. 
The trial judge denied Kirton's motion primarily because 
the jury found that Kirton had acted negligently, and as such he 
did not believe that the statute mandated indemnification. Vol. 
492 at 19-20. The trial judge reasoned that the finding of 
negligence meant that the lawyers had not acted in good faith, 
which he read as a prerequisite to mandatory indemnification. Id. 
Subsection (c) mandates indemnification if the agent has 
been successful in defense of any suit referred to in subsections 
(a) or (b) of the statute. As noted above, subsection (a) 
describes lawsuits brought by a third party against the agent, and 
subsection (b) describes lawsuit brought by the corporation or 
brought in the right of the corporation (i.e. a derivative 
lawsuit). Those are the lawsuits referred to in subsection (c). 
The only time a finding of good faith is necessary is if the 
corporation voluntarily elects to indemnify the agent. The reason 
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such a finding is required for voluntary payments is that the 
corporation can indemnify the agent even if he is found liable. 
Utah Code Ann. S 16-10-4(2)(a)-(b). 
This interpretation of the statute is consistent with the 
legislative history and court decisions of other jurisdictions 
that have adopted similar indemnification statutes. In Delaware, 
the Reporter to the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Commission 
originally suggested that the good-faith requirement contained in 
subsections (a) and (b) be incorporated into the mandatory 
indemnification provisions of subsection (c). This suggestion was 
rejected, however. The legislature instead decided to indemnify 
any person who was successful, whether on a technical defense or 
otherwise, and even if that person could not meet the standard of 
conduct described in subsections (a) and (b). The underlying 
policy reason was that the legislature wanted to attract 
incorporators to Delaware. Barrett, Mandatory Indemnification of 
Corporate Officers and Directors, 29 S.W.L.J. 727, 733 (1975). 
In Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138 
(Del. Super. 1974), one of the plaintiffs had been charged with 
criminal indictments. He was subsequently found guilty on one 
count and the balance of the charges were dropped. The plaintiff 
requested indemnification under the Delaware indemnification 
statute (which is substantively identical to the Utah statute). 
The corporation argued that the statute should mandate 
indemnification only where there has been vindication by a finding 
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or concession of innocence. The court disagreed. It said that as 
to the matter upon which guilt had been found the plaintiff could 
not recover, but as to all other matters, the statute required 
ohly that the plaintiff be successful, on the merits or 
otherwise. The court never examined the good faith of the 
plaintiffs. 
In this case, Judge Russon misinterpreted the statute. 
The Utah indemnification statute has been written as broadly as 
possible. It mandates indemnification to successful parties and 
it does not care how they arrive at their success. 
B. Kirton Was an Agent of Western and is Entitled to 
Indemnification. 
The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines "agency" as 
follows: 
(1) Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from 
the manifestation of consent by one person to another 
that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his 
control, and consent by the other so to act. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency S 1 (1958). Western retained 
Kirton to act on its behalf, and Kirton was subject to Western's 
control. The act of retaining Kirton was a manifestation of 
consent to Kirton so acting. Further, Kirton's agreeing to act as 
counsel constituted its consent to the relationship. This 
principal-agent relationship is created between every client and 
attorney when the attorney is retained to accomplish some act on 
behalf of the client or otherwise to assist the client in 
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accomplishing an act. This fact is recognized by the Restatement 
itself, where in the official comment it states "the 
attorney-at-law . . . and other similar persons employed either 
for a single transaction or for a series of transactions, are 
agents. . . ." Id. § 1, comment on subsection (3). 
That attorneys are agents for purposes of indemnification 
has been recognized in at least one other jurisdiction. In 
Katayama v. Interpacific Properties, a defendant-attorney in a 
legal malpractice action was specifically found to be an agent of 
his client for purposes of the indemnification provisions of the 
4 
California Corporations Code. 
The fact Kirton was sued for alleged malpractice does not 
mean that Western can avoid the statutory obligation of 
indemnification. Kirton is entitled to indemnification from 
Western for Kirton's costs and expenses, including, without 
limitation, attorneys' fees and court costs. All of the 
requirements for mandatory indemnification under 
Section 16-10-4(2)(c) have been met. Kirton was an agent of 
Western, was sued by reason of undertaking to act as agent, and 
has prevailed in the lawsuit. 
4Cal.Corp. Code § 317(d). This subsection is substantively 
identical to Utah Code Ann. S 16-10-4(2)(c) (1987). 236 Cal. 
Rptr. at 108. As such, the court ruled that the attorney was 
entitled to indemnification. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the jury's verdict that Kirton, 
McConkie & Bushnell has no liability to Western Fiberglass, Inc. 
should be affirmed. This Court should also reverse the ruling of 
the trial judge denying Kirton's motion for indemnity and award 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell its' costs, expenses, and attorney's 
fees incurred by it in this action. 
DATED this day of August, 1988. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
<fMm<u) g, 
Stephen B. Nebeke 
Thomas L. Kay 
Attorneys for Defendant Kirton, 
McConkie & Bushnell 
1484k 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
WESTERN FIBERGLASS 
vs. 
KIRTON, MC CONKIE & 
Plaintiff ) 
BUSHNELL ) 
Defendants ) 
5Uf& 
Transcript of: 
TRIAL 
(5 of 6 days) 
Case C86-5552 
* * * * * 
The above-entitled cause of action came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Leonard H. 
Russon, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of 
the State of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Tuesday, 
December 8, 1987, at 9:00 a.m. 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendants: 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
JOSEPH F. FOX 
Attorney at Law 
9160 South 300 West 
Sandy, Utah 
THOMAS L. KAY 
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER 
Attorneys at Lav; 
7 9 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
MAY e <930 
Deputy Clerk 
1 Your Honor. 
2 I THE COURT: Sustained. 
3 J Q (By Mr. Fox) Did you have any conversations with 
4 I Mr. Kay prior to testifying at the deposition? 
5 J MR. KAY: That calls for hearsay, Your Honor. 
I 
6 I THE COURT: Overruled, he can answer that yes or 
7 I no. 
8 I THE WITNESS: Yes. 
9 I 0 (By Mr. Fox) Did Mr. Kay tell you anything about 
10 I the significance between the terns "release -- M 
n I THE COURT: Hold on. Let's come up to the bench. 
12 J (Off the record discussion between Court and 
13 J counsel. ) 
14 I THE COURT: Let me see the exhibit. 
15 I MR. FOX: S2-P and 56-P. 
16 1 THE COURT: (Pause) I don't have time to look at 
all of these. Go aheac with your question. I will come 
back to tftose. If tne question is posed for me to deal with 
those documents, you may ask your next question. 
Q (By Mr. Fox) Mr. Bailie, subsequent to your 
n a v m g had your deposition taKen, did you sign an affidavit 
relative to a portion of tnat deposition? 
A I did. 
Q Did you say in your affidavit — 
MR. KAY: Objection, Your Honor. 
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1 THE COURT: Sustained. 
2 1 Q (By Mr. Fox) Subsequent to your having your 
3 I deposition taken, did you talk with Mr. Radman regarding 
4 I the deposition? 
5 I A I did. 
6 I Q And do you recall that conversation? 
7 ft MR. KAY: Objection, calls for hearsay. 
8 I THE COURT: Sustained. 
9 MR. FOX: With Mr. Radman? 
10 J (Off the record discussion between Court and 
11 I counsel. ) 
12 J Q (By Mr. Fox) Do you recall a conversation you had 
13 I with Mr. Radman after your deposition? 
-14 | A I do. 
Q Do you remember when that conversation was? 15 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
16
 I A The s p e c i f i c da te? 
17
 • Q Do you r e c a l l the d a t e ? 
IB A I do not. 
Q Do you recall what you said to Mr. Radman? 
A We discussed a number of things in the conversation 
Q Your testimony a little while ago was that you had 
told Mr. Radman, or you were present in conversations with 
Mr. Radman where he was told that his right to retake the 
possession of the equipment was subject to senior liens. 
Do you recall his comments after the deposition regarding that? 
10 
n 
12 
A Yes. 
2 | Q What did you tell him? 
2 I A I reaffirmed that was my recollection of the 
A I conversations. 
5 I MR. FOX: I don't have further questions. 
5 I MR. KAY: We have nothing further, Your Honor. 
7 I THE COURT: You may step down. 
8 | MR. KAY: Your Honor, may this witness be excused? 
9 J He has to catch a plane back to Virginia. 
THE COURT: Mr. Fox, you want this witness excused?] 
MR. FOX: Yes. 
THE COURT: You are also free to leave. You may 
13 | call your next witness. 
-j4 I MR. FOX: Your Honor, I don't think we have anymore 
15 I witnesses. I need to check and make sure our exhibits are 
16 I admitted and a couple of matters are cleaned up. 
17 J MR. NEBEKER: Your Honor, we will have a motion 
IB J to make. I am just wondering in view of time if it would 
19 J be appropriate for us to have some time to discuss that 
20 J matter with the Court since it is now about 20 to 12. 
21 I THE COURT: Am I to understand, Mr. Fox, that you 
22 I are now resting the plaintiff's case with the single 
23 J exception of checking exhibits to make sure all are in 
24 I that you want in? 
25
 I MR. FOX: Yes. 
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Q Did you discuss with anybody security over the 
equipment? 
A No, I did not, except that when the agreement 
was written, it was discussed what kind of security we 
can get and the security that was left over was the accounts 
receivable. 
Q Had you known you couldn't take your equipment 
back, would your negotiations have been different? 
MR. KAY: Objection, calls for speculation. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. FOX: May we approach the bench, Your Honor. 
27 
1 J THE COURT: You may. 
(Off the record discussion between Court and 
counsel. The last question was read back by the reporter.) 
4 I MR. KAY: Your Honor, we objected on the ground 
5 | of speculation and that is still our objection. 
6 I THE COURT: Sustained. 
7 I MR. FOX: Your Honor, we don't have any other 
8 I questions of this witness. 
9 I THE COURT: You may cross examine. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KAY: 
Q Mr. Radman, yesterday or Tuesday, I believe you 
testified you never borrowed money in Australia; is that 
correct? 
A No. 
Q What did you testify? 
17 | A I testified we used overdraft. 
18 I Q Was that like borrowing money? 
19 I A I presume, if that is what you call it. 
20 J Q Will you explain to us what an overdraft is? 
21 I A An overdraft is when you are a good customer of 
22 I the bank, they don't ask you to do anything. They just 
23 J increase as they do here in Salt Lake, for that manner. 
24 J They just pay your checks as they come through. 
25 J Q is that money that you necessarily don't have in 
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ADDENDUM 3 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 16-10-4(2) (a)-(c) 
(a) A corporation may indemnify any person who was or is 
a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, 
pending, or completed action, suit, or proceeding, whether civil, 
criminal, administrative, or investigative, (except not an action 
by or in the right of the corporation) by reason of the fact that 
he is or was a director, officer, employee, or agent of the corpo-
ration, or is or was serving at the request of the corporation 
as a director, officer, employee, or agent of another corporation, 
partnership, joint venture, trust, or other enterprise against 
expenses, including attorneyfs fees, judgments, fines, and amounts 
paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by him in con-
nection with the action, suit, or proceeding if he acted in good 
faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed 
to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to 
any criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe 
his conduct was unlawful. The termination of any action, suit 
or proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or upon 
a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent, shall not, of itself, 
create a presumption that the person did not act in good faith 
and in a manner which he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed 
to the best interests of the corporation, and with respect to any 
criminal action or proceeding, had reasonable cause to believe 
his conduct was unlawful. 
(b) A corporation may indemnify any person who was or is 
a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, 
pending, or completed action or suit by or in the right of the 
corporation to procure a judgment in its favor by reason of the 
fact that he is or was a director, officer, employee, or agent 
of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the 
corporation as a director, officer, employee, or agent of another 
corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, or other enterprise 
against expenses, including attorney's fees actually and reasonably 
incurred by him in connection with the defense or settlement of 
the action or suit if he acted in good faith and in a manner he 
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests 
of the corporation, except that no indemnification shall be made 
in respect of any claim, issue, or matter as to which the person 
shall have been adjudged to be liable to the corporation, unless 
and only to the extent that the court in which such action or suit 
was brought shall determine upon application that, despite the 
adjudication of liability but in view of all circumstances of the 
case, the person is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity 
for such expenses as the court considers proper. 
(c) To the extent that a director, officer, employee, or 
agent of a corporation has been successful on the merits or other-
wise in defense of any action, suit or proceeding referred to in 
Subsection 2(a) or (b), or in defense of any claim, issue, or matter 
therein, he shall be indemnified against expenses, including attor-
neys1 fees, which he actually and reasonably incurred in connection 
therewith. 
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this opn. in the Official Reports (Cal. Const., art. VI, • 
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MacDonald, Halsted & Laybourne, Gordon E. Bosserman and Karen A. Pikulin for 
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CROSBY 
CROSBY, J. 
Does the Corporations Code require a corporate plaintiff to indemnify its 
ormer lawyer for his costs and attorneys fees after he prevailed in an action 
t brought against him for legal malpractice? We hold it does and that the 
orporation may not limit its liability to the deductible amount of the 
ttorneyfs malpractice coverage. 
Interpacific Properties, Inc. sued Arthur S. Katayama for legal malpractice, 
laiming he entered into an unauthorized settlement of a multimillion dollar 
awsuit on behalf of the corporation. Katayama cross-complained for 
Dproximately $12,000 in attorneys fees for his representation of Interpacific 
i the underlying litigation and for indemnity for the expenses, including legal 
ses, he would incur in defense of the malpractice suit. The latter claim was 
ade under Corporations Code section 317, subdivisions (c) and (d). 
The malpractice action was tried first and Interpacific lost. n1 Trial on the 
*oss-complaint followed, and the court awarded Katayama $12,637.76 on his cause 
• action for fees earned while serving as Interpacific's counsel. The court 
irther found Katayama was an agent of the corporation within the meaning of 
>rporations Code section 317, subdivision (a), that he was successful in his 
sfense of the action brought by the corporation, and that he reasonably 
curred expenses, including attorneys fees, in the sum of $137,041.21 to defend 
e malpractice action. 
n1 Interpacific may have a decent malpractice action now . It noticed an 
peal from the judgment in the main action, but it was twice dismissed for 
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its counsel's failure to follow required procedures and twice reinstated upon 
lis application. The appeal was finally dismissed on March 28, 1985, for failure 
to deposit costs for the preparation of the appellate record, (Cal. Rules of 
Sourt, rule 10(c).) We rejected a third motion to revive the appeal many months 
later brought by Interpacific's current attorneys who were not involved in the 
natter previously. 
Nevertheless, the court concluded that Corporations Code section 317, 
subdivision (d) 'was intended and applies to the situation where an agent of a 
corporation successfully defends against an action by a third party or against a 
lerivative action by the corporation, and that it does not apply to the 
situation where, as in the present case, the corporation in a non-derivative 
ype proceeding sues its agent, even if the agent prevails in the action.* 
'udgment was entered for Interpacific on Katayama's cause of action for 
ndemnification under the Corporations Code. Katayama appeals from that portion 
>f the judgment. 
I 
The Legislature added section 317 to the Corporations Code in 1975, effective 
anuary 1, 1977. (Stats. 1975, ch. 682, 0 7, p. 1541.) It was based on language 
n the American Bar Association Model Business Corporations Act, section 5, and 
s virtually identical to corresponding legislation in New York, Delaware, Ohio, 
nd other states. Subdivision (a) of section 317 furnishes definitions for 
arious terms. For example, 'agent' is defined as anyone who has served a 
orporation in the capacity of 'director, officer, employee or other agent . . . 
' And "'proceeding' means any threatened, pending or completed action or 
roceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative or investigative . . . .' 
Expenses' include attorneys fees and all costs reasonably incurred to establish 
ie right to indemnification. Subdivision (b) provides for indemnification of 
iy agent who is or is threatened to be a party to any proceeding other than 
ie 'by or in the right of the corporation . . . .' Traditionally, this hasmeant 
:orporate agents may seek indemnification for third party civil actions 
id criminal prosecutions. 
Subdivision (c) provides, 'A corporation shall have power to indemnify any 
*rson who was or is a party . . . to any [] pending or completed action by or 
\ the right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor by reason of 
ie fact that such person is or was an agent of the corporation, against 
cpenses actually and reasonably incurred by such person in connection with the 
ifense or settlement of such action if such person acted in good faith . . . .' 
talics added.) Subdivision (d) mandates indemnification of the agent '[t]o the 
tent [he] has been successful on the merits in defense of any proceeding 
ferred to in subdivision (b) or (c) . . . .' 
The language in section 317, subdivisions (c) and (d) is straightforward and 
ambiguous; and its literal terms require indemnification of an attorney who 
ccessfully defends a legal malpractice action brought by a former corporate 
ient. Nevertheless, we recognize that commentators invariably discuss 
bdivision (c) only as it relates to derivative actions, as that term is used 
the corporate context, i.e., a lawsuit by one or more shareholders on behalf 
the corporation. (See, e.g., 1 Marsh, Marsh's Cal. Corporation Law (2d ed. 
85 supp.) Executive Compensation and Indemnification, • 9.36, pp. 536-537; 1 
llantine & Sterling, Cal. Corporation Laws (4th ed. 1985) Indemnification and 
surance, • 109.01, p. 6-39; Heyler, Indemnification of Corporate Agents 
PAGE 
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__ . ,..*. . .* *.c^  .1 / l n t e r p a c m c attempts to put 
its own lyrics to the melody * * r articles*. It argues subdivision (c) must 
only apply when the corporation and agent are on the 'same side ;,* . _ 
litigation,' e.g., when disgruntled minority shareholders sue, or when the 
corporation sues a third party who n turn cross-complains against the agent, 
Fed-Mart Corp . v. Pell EnterpriM* ~- #*~~~* - - -a«j A(jp ^ 218-21 h 
[166 Cal.Rptr. 525]. ) 
In support of i ts contention Interpacif ic suggests there is r* <::<- ^n^ if i the 
predecessor statute, former Corporations Code section 830, to lend support to 
Katayamafs fdistort[ed]' interpretation of section 317. Not so. Former section 
830 provided in part, * (a) When a person is sued, either alone or with others, 
because he is or was a director, officer, or employee of a corporation, [] in 
any proceeding arising out of his alleged misfeasance or nonfeasance in the 
performance of his duties or out of any alleged wrongful act against the 
corporation or by the corporation, indemnity for his reasonable expenses, 
including attorneys* fees incurred in the defense of the proceeding, may be 
assessed against the corporation, [] by the court in the same or a separate 
Droceeding, if both of the following conditions exist: [P] (1) The person sued 
is successful in whole or in part, or the proceeding against him is settled with 
;he approval of the "court. [P] (?N -ru~ :rt finds th^t *:.-,:, conduct fa iv 1> ar id 
equitably merits such indemnity. 
"[Text omitted.] 
' d) I'his section applies to all pnoceedinfi 'Spec i fie d "»""" subdivision (a>, 
-_..ei brought by the corporation, its receiver, its trustee, one or more of 
ts shareholders or creditors, any governmental body, any public official, or 
.ny private person or corporation, domestic or foreign. , , .'" (Ita lies added.) 
We have located only one California appellate opinion discussing &. 
ight to indemnification for successfully defending a direct action b> 
orporation under former section 830, and it is of no assistance to 
nterpacific. In New Capital for Small Businesses, Inc . v. Saunders ~e 
al.App.2d 728 [30 Cal.Rptr. 563], a corporation obtained a judgmen ac-a-'.. 
ttorney, who was also a director, on a common count for money had and received 
ased on unauthorized payments to himself of commissions from the sale of 
^rporate stock. Notwithstanding the corporation's success, the attorney sought 
identification under section 830. The court dismissed his contention because Ile 
is not the successful party, but the opinion never suggests an agent who 
"evails in P Hircrt «/-••;-- py i^ ie corporation could not recover his fees. 
Case law interpreting the current statute and its out-of-state cousir 
>arse, and there is none to our knowledge from California courts. But w* ^ 
>cated two opinions from other jurisdictions, and they support Katayama's 
sition. In Professional Ins. Co. * , Barry (1969) 60 Misc.2d 424 [303 N.Y € d 
6] , a corporation sued a former director for breach of fiduciary duty, -
oss-complained for indemnity under the applicable New York statute, Business 
rporation Law section 722, which is similar to our section 317. The opinion is 
t clear on the point, but the director apparently undertook his relationship 
th Professional at the request of another corporation, Schapiro & Co., Inc. 
e court conceded he was entitled to indemnification from Professional if he 
evailed and met the other requisites of the statute ( id., 303 N.Y.8.2d at p. 
D) and concluded he might be entitled to indemnification from Schaoiro as 
n. 
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In Lawson v. Young (1984) 21 Ohio App.3d 190 [486 N.E.2d 1177] the receiver 
Tor an insolvent corporation sued the directors for fraud. The directors 
prevailed; but the trial court refused to award attorneys fees under Revised 
Sode 1701.13(E)(3), which i6 identical to our statute. The appellate court 
reversed, observing, 'Clearly, had [the corporation] brought the action against 
[the directors] alleging fraud and mismanagement . . . and had [the directors] 
successfully defended 6uch an action, [the corporation] would have been 
obligated pursuant to R.C. 1701.13(E)(3) to indemnify [the directors] for their 
expenses incurred in the successful defense of such an action.9 ( Id., 486 
Nl.E.2d at p. 1179.) 
We see no logical reason to view Katayama's position any differently. 
Corporations may be treated as persons under the law in general, but they are 
creatures of statute and subject to a wide range of rules and obligations not 
imposed on individuals. In the context of litigation expenses, a rationale for 
disparate treatment is not difficult to divine. Corporations may only operate 
through agents by their very nature, and they are frequently wealthy and able to 
pursue prolonged and complex litigation that few individuals could afford to 
defend. And a direct suit by a corporation is no less costly to defend than the 
same claim brought as a derivative action by minority shareholders. In the 
latter situation, of course, the successful agent is unquestionably entitled to 
indemnification. Thus, we see nothing in the statute itself, or the apparent 
policy behind it, supportive of Interpacific's argument. 
Ill 
Katayama's legal malpractice insurer retained an attorney who represented him 
both in his capacity as a defendant and cross-complainant. The reasonable 
expenses for the defense of the main action alone totaled $137,041.21, according 
to the trial court's findings. Of this sum, however, Katayama's out-of-pocket 
expenses were only $1,000, his deductible under the malpractice policy. 
Interpacific's final contention is that if it must indemnify Katayama, it is 
responsible only for that $1,000. Again we disagree. 
A similar argument was rejected by Division One of this court in Fed-Mart 
Corp . v. Pell Enterprises, Inc., supra, 111 Cal.App.3d 215. There, the trial 
judge determined the corporation's former president, Sol Price, was entitled to 
indemnification from Fed-Mart and ordered the corporation to pay him $73,600. 
Price had 'an informal' fee arrangement with his counsel: '[T]he attorney would 
be entitled to receive fees only after Price's right to indemnification had beer 
established by the court. The amount of attorney fees was to be whatever the 
trial court determined to be 'reasonable' . . . .' (Id., at p. 228.) Based on 
this understanding, Price actually paid $50,000 to his lawyers during the course 
of the litigation. On appeal Fed-Mart launched a two-pronged attack on the 
award: First, it argued its obligation to indemnify should be limited to Price's 
out-of-pocket expenses. Second, Fed-Mart contended the arrangement constituted i 
contingent fee agreement which was 'not subject to indemnification under sectior 
317 because the fees were not 'actually incurred.'" ( Id.f at p. 229.) 
The Court of Appeal disagreed: 'Fed-Mart's argument assaults a straw man. The 
trial court determined . . . what legal expenses were actually incurred and 
their reasonableness. The court's assessment was based upon statutory duties 
imposed on Fed-Mart and the court, not upon any arrangement, contingent or 
otherwise, existing between Price and his attorney .' ( Ibid ., italics added.) 
The same logic applies in this situation as well. 
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indemnified against expenses actually and reasonab lj ' incurred by t he ayvtil . 
.
f
 Actual payment by the agent is not a prerequisite to the right to 
indemnification. Katayama reasonably incurred legal expenses of- $137,04
 (k n 
order to defend Interpacific's complaint. That his legal malpractice insurei was 
obligated, pursuant to a wholly unrelated contract, to assume the financial 
burden of providing his defense does not alter the fact that the expenses were 
actually incurred or that Interpacific had a statutory obligation to pay them. 
n2 In other words, having lost on the merits, Interpacific is not entitled to be 
treated as a third party beneficiary of Katayama*s policy. (See also Staples v. 
Hoefke (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1397, 1410 [235 Cal.Rptr, 165], where the Court of 
Appeal affirmed an award of attorneys fees under Civ. Code, 0 1717: * Plaintiffs 
were not entitled to avoid their contractual obligation to pay reasonable 
attorney fees based on the fortuitous circumstance that they sued a defendant 
who obtained insurance coverage providing- a defense.') 
n2 We note that Katayama does not stand to enjoy a windfall «A i i) 
reimbursement he receives, according to his counsel's undisputed 
representations, is payable to his insurer. The expenses were incurred because 
of Interpacific's conduct and were entirely beyond the carrier's cont r ol Thi is. 
as between Interpacific and the insurer, it makes perfect sense that 
Interpacific bear the cost 
Judgment rever seel, Appe i iai it is entitled to costs on appea i , i • i I i g 
orneys fees, to be determined on remand by the trial court. 
Trotter, P. I i:ii d S :: i e i isl n in e , f :: : m i :: •  HI 
